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	<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 13:59:45 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Lehman Wants To Short-Circuit Short Sellers</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/201</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/201#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 13:59:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[

A tática que o Lehman quer aplicar chama-se Bear Corner. Só a título de curiosidade: Uma tentativa de Bear Corner foi o estopim da crise de 1907. 

By SUSANNE CRAIG
April 1, 2008
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. has unveiled its latest attempt to try to shake the shorts.
On Monday, the firm announced it plans to issue $3 billion [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 style="margin: 0px" class="articleTitle"></h1>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif; padding-top: 12px"><span style="font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif" id="byl"></span></p>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif; padding-top: 12px"><span style="font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif">A tática que o Lehman quer aplicar chama-se Bear Corner. Só a título de curiosidade: Uma tentativa de Bear Corner foi o estopim da crise de 1907. </span></p>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif; padding-top: 12px"><span style="font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif"></span></p>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif; padding-top: 12px"><span style="font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif">By <strong>SUSANNE CRAIG</strong><br />
<span class="aTime"><em><font size="2" color="#666666">April 1, 2008</font></em></span></span></p>
<p class="times"><a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=leh" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for LEH');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Lehman Brothers Holdings</font></a> Inc. has unveiled its latest attempt to try to shake the shorts.</p>
<p class="times">On Monday, the firm announced it plans to issue $3 billion of preferred shares, a move that will strengthen its balance sheet and that it hopes will dispel speculation that it is facing a capital crunch. The question now: Will it be enough? &#8220;I think an issue of this size with the investors we have on board will put the false rumors about our capital position to rest,&#8221; said Lehman Chief Financial Officer Erin Callan.</p>
<p><img border="0" align="left" width="223" src="http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/MI-AP743_LEHMAN_20080331182505.gif" alt="[Rising Shorts]" height="344" class="imglftbdy" /></p>
<p class="times">Not everyone is on board. The Wall Street brokerage has become a favorite target of short sellers, traders who make money by betting that a stock&#8217;s price will fall. The shorts now will likely ask: If Lehman had enough capital, why did it need to do the new issue, which will dilute the stakes of existing shareholders by potentially increasing shares outstanding by about 5%?</p>
<p class="times">Thursday, the stock fell almost 9%. Two weeks ago, in the wake of the forced sale of Bear Stearns Cos. to J.P. Morgan Chase &amp; Co., Lehman&#8217;s stock took another nasty tumble, falling 19% to a 4½-year low. Some Lehman shareholders blamed the decline on heavy selling by short sellers, who borrow shares and sell them, hoping to buy them back at a lower price and lock in a profit.</p>
<p class="times">Monday, Lehman&#8217;s stock fell 23 cents to $37.64 in 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading. But in after-hours trading, the share price declined $1.12 to $36.52. Lehman maintains that the stock will rebound once investors learn both the terms of the offering and the fact that it has been &#8220;substantially&#8221; presold. Late last night, Lehman said there was $11 billion in investor demand for its offering.</p>
<p class="times">So far this year, Lehman&#8217;s stock is down 43%, compared with 16% for the Dow Jones Wilshire U.S. Financial Services Index and 23% and 14%, respectively, for rivals <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=GS" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for GS');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Goldman Sachs Group</font></a> Inc. and <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=ms" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for MS');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Morgan Stanley</font></a>. Lehman says that over the past few months it has been trying to lower the amount of debt it takes on relative to its assets, both by selling assets and now by raising capital &#8212; so the new offering isn&#8217;t necessarily aimed at beating back the short sellers.</p>
<p class="times">Still, as of March 12, there were 46.6 million shares, 9.1% of Lehman&#8217;s total float, sold short. That is up from 9.4 million shares at the beginning of the year, according to the NYSE. Investors also are loading up on Lehman options, another way to bet on a fall in the firm&#8217;s stock.</p>
<p class="times">The firm says it has enough cash on hand to weather the current crisis, $31 billion in cash and cash equivalents and another $65 billion in assets it can easily borrow against. Furthermore, thanks to a recent change in the rules, it now has access for the first time to Federal Reserve funds, a move that gives Lehman access to an essentially unlimited pool of money at the same rate as commercial banks.</p>
<p class="times">Lehman is no stranger to the skeptics. The brokerage and its chairman, Richard Fuld Jr., fought off rumors about a cash crunch in 1998 that were triggered by the near-collapse of hedge fund Long Term Capital Management. At that time, the firm hired a private-investigation firm to get to the bottom of the speculation circling the company. Since then, Mr. Fuld has won praise for diversifying Lehman, long known as a bond house, into lucrative areas like stock trading and investment banking.</p>
<p class="times">This time around, the firm has publicly spoken out against the shorts. It has met with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and top management is actively trying to track down the source of rumors as they arise.</p>
<p class="times">The main concern: Lehman&#8217;s still-sizable exposure to the mortgage market makes it easy for critics to draw comparisons to Bear. A recent Bank of America report notes that mortgages represent 29% of total assets at Lehman, roughly in line with Bear, which had one-third of its assets in mortgages, and much higher than Merrill Lynch &amp; Co. and Goldman Sachs, both at 12%, and 13% at Morgan Stanley. Ms. Callan estimates Lehman&#8217;s total real-estate exposure is closer to 20% and it is a skilled operator in managing real-estate assets.</p>
<p class="times">&#8220;Looking toward the remainder of 2008, Lehman investors will be nervously waiting to see if the firm, with its balance sheet loaded with $87 billion of troubled assets which are under pricing pressure and which can&#8217;t be easily sold, will be able to navigate the continuing credit storm and the de-leveraging environment that we anticipate,&#8221; wrote Brad Hintz, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein &amp; Co. and a former chief financial officer at Lehman.</p>
<p class="times">Nearly $31 billion of its holdings are commercial-real-estate loans. Even as it cut way back on making home loans, Lehman continued to lend to buyers of office buildings and other assets, and analysts expect it will take a hit on these this year.</p>
<p class="times">A big concern is Lehman&#8217;s 2007 investment in Archstone-Smith Trust, which it bought with Tishman Speyer Properties in May 2007, just as the real-estate market was beginning to melt. Lehman bought in at $60.75 a share. Archstone is now private, but shares of its publicly traded rivals are down substantially, suggesting Lehman&#8217;s investment is underwater.</p>
<p class="times">During a conference call to discuss its first-quarter earnings, Lehman said it currently holds $2.3 billion of Archstone&#8217;s non-investment-grade debt and $2.2 billion of equity, both of which Ms. Callan said are being carried &#8220;materially below par.&#8221; She said Lehman is working to sell assets and improve Archstone&#8217;s financial profile. Lehman says it has taken write-downs on this investment, but the size of the haircut isn&#8217;t known because it doesn&#8217;t release this data on individual investments.</p>
<p class="times">Lehman also has significant exposure to so-called Alt-A mortgages, which let borrowers disclose less information about their income than standard mortgages. These loans have been under increased stress in recent months as delinquencies have risen at rapid rate.</p>
<p class="times">Overall, the bank has about $31.8 billion in residential-mortgage exposure and $13.5 billion is Alt-A. The firm has taken $3 billion in write-downs on the residential portfolio, a substantial portion of which was Alt-A. On this front, Lehman argues this positioned is hedged, meaning that any losses will be offset by gains elsewhere.</p>
<p class="times"><strong>Write to </strong>Susanne Craig at <a href="mailto:susanne.craig@wsj.com" class="times"><font color="#0253b7">susanne.craig@wsj.com</font></a></p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Caught with its pants down: Lehman scammed out of $350 million</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/200</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/200#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 13:33:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/200</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[(from www.wallstreetfolly.com)



Embarrassingly bad due diligence by a supposedly sophisticated investment banking firm?:  As if Lehman Brothers isn&#8217;t already up to its eyeballs in problems, now they&#8217;re claiming that they were scammed out of $350 million in an elaborately staged swindle. They thought they were ultimately lending cash to a partnership backed by Japanese trading house [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>(from <a href="http://www.wallstreetfolly.com/">www.wallstreetfolly.com</a>)</p>
<h3 class="entry-header"></h3>
<p class="entry-content">
<p class="entry-body"><img border="0" width="205" src="http://files.wallstreetfolly.com/photos/LehmanBrothersCaughtWithPantsDown-001.jpg" height="240" style="float: left; margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px" title="LehmanBrothersCaughtWithPantsDown-001" /></p>
<p>Embarrassingly bad due diligence by a supposedly sophisticated investment banking firm?:  As if Lehman Brothers isn&#8217;t already up to its eyeballs in problems, now they&#8217;re claiming that they were scammed out of $350 million in an elaborately staged swindle. They thought they were ultimately lending cash to a partnership backed by Japanese trading house Marubeni Corp, but instead found that they had lent money to a big fat fraud created by a few Marubeni employees using a series of forged internal documents. Marubeni says they knew nothing about the transaction.  Major oopsie.   Now Lehman is suing Marubeni, which claims that the company isn&#8217;t responsible for the losses &#8220;accordingly, we have no obligation to pay any of these demands&#8221;&#8230;.</p>
<blockquote>
<p style="background-color: #e1ffff">Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. has gone to court in Tokyo in an effort to recover $350 million it says it was bilked out of through an elaborate scheme in which employees of a big Japanese trading company allegedly used forged documents and an imposter to raise cash.</p>
<p>The purported swindle, which involved the establishment of a partnership to fund the refurbishment of hospitals, allegedly involved two employees of Marubeni Corp., a 150-year-old trading house, according to people familiar with the situation.</p></blockquote>
<p><a id="more"></a></p>
<p class="entry-more">
<blockquote>
<p style="background-color: #e1ffff">The apparent fraud, which could be one of the biggest and boldest in recent corporate history, involved a funding partnership the New York investment bank entered into with a medical consultancy owned by Tokyo pharmaceutical company LTT Bio-Pharma Co. late last year.</p>
<p>Lehman thought the funds it committed to providing to the partnership were backed by Marubeni, based on documents on Marubeni letterhead that bore a Marubeni board member&#8217;s seal, which the investment bank later found was forged. At least two meetings to finalize Lehman&#8217;s participation in the partnership were held at Marubeni&#8217;s headquarters, according to the people familiar with the situation&#8230;.</p></blockquote>
<p><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120686751070074911.html"><font color="#003366">Lehman Sues Japan Firm, Claiming $350 Million Fraud</font></a> - Wall Street Journal</p>
<p><a href="http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article3648839.ece"><font color="#003366">Lehman Brothers file criminal complaint after ‘$350m scam’</font></a> - The Times of London<a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f9092a16-fe80-11dc-9e04-000077b07658.html"><font color="#003366"><br />
</font></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f9092a16-fe80-11dc-9e04-000077b07658.html"><font color="#003366">Lehman sues Marubeni for Y35bn</font></a> - Financial Times</p>
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		<title>UBS May Have Further $11 Billion Writedown, Merrill Lynch Says</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/199</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/199#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 13:31:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/199</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[By Sarah Jones
March 31 (Bloomberg) &#8212; UBS AG, Europe&#8217;s biggest bank by assets, may write down a further $11 billion in the first quarter and post a loss in 2008, according to Merrill Lynch &#38; Co.
The brokerage also slashed its full-year earnings-per-share estimate for Credit Suisse Group, Switzerland&#8217;s second-largest bank, by 13 percent.
&#8220;We expect the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Sarah Jones</p>
<p>March 31 (Bloomberg) &#8212; <a T_ABOVE="true" T_STATIC="true" T_FONTCOLOR="#000000" T_FONTFACE="Verdana,sans-serif" T_BGCOLOR="#ddedd9" T_WIDTH="110" T_DELAY="50" href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=UBSN%3AVX">UBS AG</a>, Europe&#8217;s biggest bank by assets, may write down a further $11 billion in the first quarter and post a loss in 2008, according to Merrill Lynch &amp; Co.</p>
<p>The brokerage also slashed its full-year earnings-per-share estimate for <a T_ABOVE="true" T_STATIC="true" T_FONTCOLOR="#000000" T_FONTFACE="Verdana,sans-serif" T_BGCOLOR="#ddedd9" T_WIDTH="110" T_DELAY="50" href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=CSGN%3AVX">Credit Suisse Group</a>, Switzerland&#8217;s second-largest bank, by 13 percent.</p>
<p>&#8220;We expect the Q1 results will bring another wave of writedowns and earnings disappointments,&#8221; London-based analysts including <a T_ABOVE="true" T_STATIC="true" T_FONTCOLOR="#000000" T_FONTFACE="Verdana,sans-serif" T_BGCOLOR="#ddedd9" T_WIDTH="110" T_DELAY="50" href="http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Derek+De+Vries&amp;site=wnews&amp;client=wnews&amp;proxystylesheet=wnews&amp;output=xml_no_dtd&amp;ie=UTF-8&amp;oe=UTF-8&amp;filter=p&amp;getfields=wnnis&amp;sort=date:D:S:d1">Derek De Vries</a> wrote in a report to investors today. &#8220;We still think the Swiss banks will need to write down their exposure to Alt-A assets, subprime assets, leveraged finance, and commercial real estate.&#8221;</p>
<p>Merrill Lynch lowered its 2008 forecast for UBS to a loss and cut its 2009 earnings-per-share estimate by 6 percent. The brokerage also reduced is 2009 EPS projection for Credit Suisse by 4 percent.</p>
<p>Credit Suisse, which already pre-announced a loss for the first quarter, may write down $2.7 billion, resulting in a loss of 200 million Swiss francs ($201 million), the analysts said.</p>
<p>Merrill Lynch maintained its &#8220;neutral&#8221; recommendations on UBS and Credit Suisse shares.</p>
<p>To contact the reporter on this story: <a T_ABOVE="true" T_STATIC="true" T_FONTCOLOR="#000000" T_FONTFACE="Verdana,sans-serif" T_BGCOLOR="#ddedd9" T_WIDTH="110" T_DELAY="50" href="http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Sarah+Jones&amp;site=wnews&amp;client=wnews&amp;proxystylesheet=wnews&amp;output=xml_no_dtd&amp;ie=UTF-8&amp;oe=UTF-8&amp;filter=p&amp;getfields=wnnis&amp;sort=date:D:S:d1">Sarah Jones</a> in London at <a T_ABOVE="true" T_STATIC="true" T_FONTCOLOR="#000000" T_FONTFACE="Verdana,sans-serif" T_BGCOLOR="#ddedd9" T_WIDTH="110" T_DELAY="50" href="mailto:sjones35@bloomberg.net">sjones35@bloomberg.net</a>.</p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Pecência, Iracema, Pacência&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/198</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/198#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 13:31:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/198</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Crise, que crise?
Estou preparando uma séria de posts sobre crises, tentando colocar o que aprendi sobre booms econômicos e &#8220;slumps&#8221;, sobre a forma como ocorrem etc. Estou tentando ser teoricamente consistente, evitando o &#8220;acho&#8221;. Então, leva tempo, que também é consumido pelo trabalho, pelos negócios paralelos em desenvolvimento, pela família - que é a melhor [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Crise, que crise?</p>
<p>Estou preparando uma séria de posts sobre crises, tentando colocar o que aprendi sobre booms econômicos e &#8220;slumps&#8221;, sobre a forma como ocorrem etc. Estou tentando ser teoricamente consistente, evitando o &#8220;acho&#8221;. Então, leva tempo, que também é consumido pelo trabalho, pelos negócios paralelos em desenvolvimento, pela família - que é a melhor &#8220;aplicação&#8221; de tempo que existe - e, enquanto isso, vamos colando coisas relevantes por aqui!</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Requiem for a prudent man</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/197</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/197#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Mar 2008 13:10:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/197</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ Mar 27th 2008
From The Economist print edition
A fund manager&#8217;s career has lessons for today&#8217;s investors
IF THE recent credit boom has taught us anything, it is that investors can be persuaded to forget about the risks when the returns look attractive. Sure enough, they are now paying the price.It is a lesson that Tony Dye, a [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><span style="font-size: 13.5pt; color: black; line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'"></span></strong><span style="font-size: 7.5pt; color: #999999; line-height: 115%; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'"><o:p></o:p></span> <span style="font-size: 7.5pt; color: #999999; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">Mar 27th 2008<br />
From The Economist print edition<o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"></p>
<p></span><strong><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">A fund manager&#8217;s career has lessons for today&#8217;s investors</span></strong><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"></p>
<p><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">IF THE recent credit boom has taught us anything, it is that investors can be persuaded to forget about the risks when the returns look attractive. Sure enough, they are now paying the price.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">It is a lesson that Tony Dye, a fund manager who died on March 10th, understood only too well. In the late 1990s, he became widely known (and occasionally mocked) as the “Dr Doom” of the financial markets. It is true that one rarely came away from a conversation with Mr Dye feeling more cheerful about life. On occasions, indeed, he could sound rather paranoid, as when he talked about the “dark forces” that were propping up the stockmarket.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">However, in Buttonwood&#8217;s opinion, Mr Dye epitomised an old-fashioned model of fund management that should still be emulated. Most people criticise him for being too early; for forecasting the collapse of technology stocks in 1998 and missing out on the last two years of a great bull market. The merits of that criticism, however, depend on what attitude fund managers should take towards risk. Mr Dye used the analogy of being asked to board a train which you were convinced would crash at some stage in its ten-station journey. The optimal strategy may be to stay on board for five stops or so. But if your main concern is safety, you should not board at all.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">The first collective fund managers, back in the 19th century, were accountants and solicitors who looked after their clients&#8217; money. They were well aware that should some of their investments go wrong, they would lose their hard-earned reputation for probity. So they were appropriately cautious.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">The idea was expressed as the “prudent-man rule”, after a Massachusetts judge suggested trustees should “observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.” The rule has been adapted and revised many times since. But the essence should surely be this. Would a fund manager advise a relative or neighbour to own such an asset? If not, then he should not buy it on behalf of his client.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">However, modern fund management interprets the concept in a different way. Managers are judged by their ability to beat the index appropriate to their market niche. If dotcom stocks are 20% of that index, it would be imprudent for the manager not to own any of them. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">Risk becomes redefined as the danger of falling short of the benchmark, rather than the risk of losing the clients&#8217; money. Indeed, the main risk faces the manager himself—clients may move elsewhere, in search of a better-performing fund. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">That is what happened to Mr Dye, whose firm Phillips &amp; Drew lost clients to rivals at the height of the dotcom boom. He duly left his job just weeks before the bubble burst, in what turned out to be a classic sell signal for the market. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">Indeed, the irony was that Mr Dye was proved right in the long run. Technology stocks were too high in the late 1990s and the Nasdaq is still less than half its 2000 peak. Those who bought either the London or New York share indices in 1998 earned a real annual return of just over 2% up to the end of 2007; safe Treasury bonds earned 3.7% over the same period.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">Mr Dye&#8217;s biggest quality was the courage of his convictions. His approach may not have delivered investors the very highest returns, but he was more concerned to avoid the lowest. In contrast, the modern approach is to follow the herd, requiring investors to buy tulips in 17th-century Holland because everyone else was doing so. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">Mr Dye&#8217;s example was not entirely in vain. Nowadays, fund managers are generally given more latitude to take “tracking risk”—to own portfolios that do not resemble the index. However, this freedom is normally granted in the hope of earning excess returns rather than with the aim of avoiding losses.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">The pain suffered during the 2000-03 bear market in shares has also encouraged investors to diversify into alternative assets, such as hedge funds and commodities. You could see this as a sign of prudence, although it is worth noting that these asset classes also yield higher fees for the fund-management industry. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: black; font-family: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">But the herd mentality is hard to overcome. When mortgage-backed securities were earning double-digit returns in 2005, fund managers who thought they were too risky were not generally lionised for their prudence. Instead, they were seen as old fogies who just didn&#8217;t get it. Mr Dye has too few successors, but the clients are at least partly to blame.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'"><o:p></o:p></span><o:p><font face="Calibri"> </font></o:p></p>
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		<title>A Decade Later, John Meriwether Must Scramble Again</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/196</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/196#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2008 14:39:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/196</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
LTCM Founder Has Tough Time
Stemming Losses at New Funds;
A Withdrawal Deadline Nears
By JENNY STRASBURG
March 27, 2008; Page C1
Ten years after overseeing a hedge-fund collapse that buckled the world&#8217;s financial markets, John Meriwether again is scrambling to stem losses and keep investors from jumping ship.
Mr. Meriwether is best known as a founder of Long-Term Capital Management, which in [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 style="margin: 0px" class="articleTitle"></h1>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; margin: 0px; font: bold 16px/17px Times New Roman, Times, Serif; color: #666; padding-top: 13px">LTCM Founder Has Tough Time<br />
Stemming Losses at New Funds;<br />
A Withdrawal Deadline Nears</p>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif; padding-top: 12px"><span style="font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif" id="byl">By <strong>JENNY STRASBURG</strong><br />
<span class="aTime"><em><font size="2" color="#666666">March 27, 2008; Page C1</font></em></span></span></p>
<p class="times">Ten years after overseeing a hedge-fund collapse that buckled the world&#8217;s financial markets, John Meriwether again is scrambling to stem losses and keep investors from jumping ship.</p>
<p class="times">Mr. Meriwether is best known as a founder of Long-Term Capital Management, which in 1998 lost $4 billion. That helped foster a global financial crisis and triggered both a Wall Street-led bailout and congressional hearings on the dangers of hedge funds, the freewheeling pools for wealthy investors and institutions that often trade heavily and rely on borrowed money to bolster returns.</p>
<p style="padding-right: 8px; padding-left: 8px; float: left; padding-bottom: 5px; margin: 0px 3px 12px 0px; width: 254px; padding-top: 5px; border: #7194ba 1px solid" id="inset" class="arial black p11"><strong><font size="2"><span class="b13">ROUGH TIMES II</span><br />
</font></strong></p>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 5px; padding-top: 4px"><span class="p11">•</span> <strong>The News:</strong> Well-known investor John Meriwether has hit a rough patch, with his largest hedge fund plunging 28% this year.</p>
<p><span class="p11">•</span> <strong> Backdrop:</strong> He founded Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that imploded in 1998, leading to a Wall Street bailout and helping foster a global financial crisis.</p>
<p><span class="p11">•</span> <strong>What&#8217;s Next:</strong> Some of his investors are restive, and have until Monday to request withdrawals.</p>
<p class="times">Now, Mr. Meriwether&#8217;s biggest fund, a bond portfolio, has plunged 28% this year; another, broader market fund is down 6%. Both had subpar performances last year.</p>
<p class="times">Some investors in the funds are seeking to get their money out. Mr. Meriwether and his colleagues at JWM Partners LLC &#8212; which he launched in 1999 with LTCM alumni &#8212; are trying to reassure investors in the two funds that they have slashed risk and will use their experience to survive this market crisis, preserving about $1.4 billion in assets.</p>
<p class="times">The struggles represent a warning signal to investors that the perils of the current crisis aren&#8217;t over despite lower market values and government efforts to calm the financial system.</p>
<p class="times">Mr. Meriwether, a 60-year-old former vice chairman of Salomon Brothers, has seen three decades of market zigzags, recessions and credit contractions. Yet he can&#8217;t corral the risks of today&#8217;s markets and is trying to play it safe, even though he believes he should be buying securities.</p>
<p class="times">&#8220;We have sharply reduced the risk and balance sheet of the portfolio,&#8221; Mr. Meriwether told clients in his bond fund, Relative Value Opportunity Fund, in a March 18 letter. &#8220;While the opportunities are among the best we recall, we continue to balance our need to control risk while attempting to capture the opportunities we feel are available.&#8221;</p>
<p class="times">Mr. Meriwether, through a principal at the firm, declined to comment.</p>
<p class="times">His funds&#8217; losing positions have included mortgage securities backed by <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=FNM" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for FNM');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Fannie Mae</font></a> and <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=FRE" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for FRE');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Freddie Mac</font></a>, trades tied to municipal bonds and triple-A-rated commercial-mortgage-backed securities, according to the letter. Those bets have eaten into his returns this year, particularly as hedge fund Peloton Partners LLP and Carlyle Capital Corp. unloaded many of the same securities as they spiraled toward demise.</p>
<p><img border="0" align="left" width="136" src="http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/HC-EJ361_Meriwe_20051027151706.gif" alt="[John Meriwether]" height="231" class="imglftbdy" /></p>
<p class="times">One of Wall Street&#8217;s best-known traders, Mr. Meriwether was featured prominently in the book &#8220;Liar&#8217;s Poker,&#8221; which depicted the antics of Salomon&#8217;s bond traders. His LTCM hedge fund, located in Greenwich, Conn., included Nobel Prize winners and math whizzes, but it was undone in 1998 by massive &#8220;leverage,&#8221; or borrowing &#8212; up to $50 for every dollar invested &#8212; which amplified losses when the markets turned on him.</p>
<p class="times">Mr. Meriwether&#8217;s recent troubles partly stem from borrowing. His bond fund had $14.90 in borrowed money for every $1 in equity at the end of February, according to the March 18 letter. Although far lower than at LTCM, the fund&#8217;s risk level, which includes leverage, was still too much for this year&#8217;s volatile environment, he and his fund managers have acknowledged in conversations with investors.</p>
<p class="times">Mr. Meriwether marketed his bond fund as a lower-risk version of LTCM&#8217;s core strategy, of identifying the next financial crisis and profiting from it by buying securities its managers consider underpriced. Investors were told that the firm would aim to keep borrowings below 15-to-1 even during less-volatile times. Mr. Meriwether and his colleagues promised to behave more conservatively, rebuilding their reputations with consistent returns. His bond fund hasn&#8217;t had a money-losing year.</p>
<p class="times">Unlike in 1998, Mr. Meriwether isn&#8217;t a central player in the current crisis. His firm has about 70 employees, most working in LTCM&#8217;s former offices in Greenwich, and some in London. Some LTCM investors invested in JWM when Mr. Meriwether started the new firm.</p>
<p class="times">His funds&#8217; recent performance comes amid comparisons of the collapse of LTCM and last week&#8217;s implosion of securities firm <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=bsc" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for BSC');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Bear Stearns</font></a> Cos. &#8212; as well as the market fallout, the government&#8217;s response and the investment opportunities created by events. In 1998, as markets throughout the world seized, the concern was to contain losses with LTCM&#8217;s trading partners, which included most of the U.S.&#8217;s major securities firms and commercial banks.</p>
<p class="times">The Federal Reserve orchestrated a controversial $3.63 billion rescue plan funded by a consortium of 14 Wall Street banks. Global markets were roiled for weeks, but the Fed pared interest rates and pumped liquidity into the system. The markets zoomed upward in 1999, leading to a technology-driven market bubble that popped in 2000.</p>
<p class="times">The current crisis is far broader and deeper. Despite efforts to rein in systemic risks, the Fed hasn&#8217;t been able to stem investor panic and market volatility. More investments than ever are unregulated with opaque pricing, and there remains the risk that trading partners won&#8217;t make good on their trades. Financial firms have written down $150 billion, and more losses are expected. Several hedge funds have collapsed.</p>
<p class="times">When Bear Stearns teetered, the Fed did more than simply orchestrate a bailout. It guaranteed $29 billion of the firm&#8217;s losses and paved the way for <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=jpm" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for JPM');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">J.P. Morgan Chase</font></a> &amp; Co. to buy Bear at a rock-bottom price &#8212; moves far more controversial than in 1998. Investors trying to pick a market bottom have gotten burned.</p>
<p class="times">JWM&#8217;s Relative Value bond fund, launched in December 1999, has lost 28% this year through last week after notching a 5.6% return in 2007, according to people familiar with the fund. The recent losses further weigh on the fund&#8217;s average annualized return since inception of about 7% through February 2008. The Lehman Brothers U.S. Aggregate Index, a measure of investment-grade bond performance, has returned an annualized 6.5% during that period.</p>
<p class="times">JWM&#8217;s bond fund, which seeks to profit from price discrepancies among stocks, bonds and other securities, trails the 9% average annualized gain of hedge funds world-wide during that period, according to Hedge Fund Research, a Chicago research firm.</p>
<p class="times">Moreover, Mr. Meriwether&#8217;s five-year-old macro fund, JWM Global Macro, which invests in broad trends through currencies, commodities, stocks and bonds, was down 6% through February after falling 5.6% in 2007. The fund has gained about 5.7% per year, on average, since it began trading in 2003. That record means the macro fund, too, trails its peers, which have gained twice as much a year, on average, during the same period.</p>
<p><img border="0" align="right" width="384" src="http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/MI-AP672_JWM_20080326190919.gif" alt="[Chart]" height="252" class="imgrgtbdy" /></p>
<p class="times">JWM&#8217;s losses this year have pared the bond fund&#8217;s assets to less than $1 billion from its peak of more than $1.3 billion, according to people familiar with the situation. The macro fund has shrunk by at least half, to about $350 million. JWM managed about $2.3 billion in total assets at the start of 2008.</p>
<p class="times">Amid the price drops and borrowing, Mr. Meriwether&#8217;s firm, like others, has been at risk of receiving margin calls, or demands for additional collateral, from lenders. JWM has remained in compliance with its lenders, according to a person familiar with the fund.</p>
<p class="times">The credit crunch and market volatility have roughed up other multibillion-dollar hedge funds, which on average have lost about 3.35% this year, according to Hedge Fund Research&#8217;s daily global performance index.</p>
<p class="times">Platinum Grove Asset Management, the $6 billion hedge-fund firm run by LTCM alumnus Myron Scholes, has lost 13% this month on credit trades, putting it 10% down for the year, according to a person familiar with the fund. Also, Farallon Capital Management LLC in San Francisco, which manages about $36 billion, has lost 5.6% this year through last week in its flagship Farallon Capital Partners fund. And Steven Cohen&#8217;s SAC Multistrategy Fund is down about 3% this year through last week, according to investors. The Stamford, Conn., firm oversees $16 billion.</p>
<p class="times">Mr. Meriwether, in phone calls and letters to clients, has been spreading the message that he learned his lesson in years past and has been playing it safe this year since his funds started losing money, according to people who have spoken with him.</p>
<p class="times">His funds&#8217; investors have until Monday to request withdrawals that would happen at the end of June. Hedge-fund managers have varying rules about such investor redemptions. In Mr. Meriwether&#8217;s case, the three-month lag could buy him some time, in addition to the funds&#8217; restrictions allowing clients to withdraw one-eighth of their capital during any given quarter.</p>
<p class="times">Meanwhile, there is a big disadvantage to reducing how much money they borrow. Lower leverage cuts into the fund&#8217;s chances of climbing back from losses. And it is a steep climb before JWM can start collecting its 20% performance fee again, in addition to the 2% of assets that the managers collect.</p>
<p class="times"><strong>Write to </strong>Jenny Strasburg at <a href="mailto:jenny.strasburg@wsj.com" class="times"><font color="#0253b7">jenny.strasburg@wsj.com</font></a></p>
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		<item>
		<title>Ten Days That Changed Capitalism</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/195</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/195#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2008 14:37:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/195</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
Officials Improvised
To Rescue Markets;
Will It Be Enough?
March 27, 2008; Page A1
The past 10 days will be remembered as the time the U.S. government discarded a half-century of rules to save American financial capitalism from collapse.
On the Richter scale of government activism, the government&#8217;s recent actions don&#8217;t (yet) register at FDR levels. They are shrouded in technicalities and [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 style="margin: 0px" class="articleTitle"></h1>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; margin: 0px; font: bold 16px/17px Times New Roman, Times, Serif; color: #666; padding-top: 13px">Officials Improvised<br />
To Rescue Markets;<br />
Will It Be Enough?<br />
<span class="aTime"><em><font size="2">March 27, 2008; Page A1</font></em></span></p>
<p class="times">The past 10 days will be remembered as the time the U.S. government discarded a half-century of rules to save American financial capitalism from collapse.</p>
<p class="times">On the Richter scale of government activism, the government&#8217;s recent actions don&#8217;t (yet) register at FDR levels. They are shrouded in technicalities and buried in a pile of new acronyms.</p>
<p><img border="0" align="right" width="136" src="http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/HC-GJ530_Paulso_20071030225949.gif" alt="[Henry Paulson]" height="231" class="imgrgtbdy" /></p>
<p class="times">But something big just happened. It happened without an explicit vote by Congress. And, though the Treasury hasn&#8217;t cut any checks for housing or Wall Street rescues, billions of dollars of taxpayer money were put at risk. A Republican administration, not eager to be viewed as the second coming of the Hoover administration, showed it no longer believes the market can sort out the mess.</p>
<p class="times">&#8220;The Government of Last Resort is working with the Lender of Last Resort to shore up the housing and credit markets to avoid Great Depression II,&#8221; economist Ed Yardeni wrote to clients.</p>
<p class="times">First, over St. Patrick&#8217;s Day weekend, the Fed (aka the Lender of Last Resort) and the Treasury forced the sale of <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=bsc" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for BSC');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Bear Stearns</font></a>, the fifth-largest U.S. investment bank, to <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=jpm" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for JPM');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">J.P. Morgan Chase</font></a> at a price so low that a shareholder rebellion prompted J.P. Morgan to raise the price. To induce J.P. Morgan to do the deal, the Fed agreed to take losses or gains, if any, on up to $29 billion of securities in Bear Stearns&#8217;s portfolio. The outcome will influence the sum the Fed turns over to the Treasury, so this is taxpayer money; that&#8217;s why the Fed sought Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson&#8217;s OK.</p>
<p style="padding-right: 8px; padding-left: 8px; float: left; padding-bottom: 5px; margin: 0px 3px 12px 0px; width: 254px; padding-top: 5px; border: #7194ba 1px solid" id="inset" class="arial black p11"><a href="http://forums.wsj.com/viewtopic.php?t=1911" class="p11"><img border="0" align="left" width="44" src="http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/it_fed-eagle09132007115712.gif" alt="[Join a discussion.]" height="48" class="imglftins" /></a> <strong><font size="2"><span class="b13">DISCUSSION</span><br />
</font></strong></p>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 3px; padding-top: 1px" class="p11">Has the U.S. government done enough to save American financial capitalism, or has it crossed a line? <a href="http://forums.wsj.com/viewtopic.php?t=1911" class="p11"><strong><font color="#0253b7">Join a discussion</font></strong></a>.</p>
<p class="times">Then the Fed lent directly to Wall Street securities firms for the first time. Until now, the Fed has lent directly only to Main Street banks, those that take deposits from ordinary folks. That&#8217;s because banks were viewed as playing a unique economic role and, supposedly, were more closely regulated than other types of lenders. In the first three days of this new era, securities firms borrowed an average of $31.3 billion a day from the Fed. That&#8217;s not small change, and it&#8217;s why Mr. Paulson, after the fact, is endorsing changes to give the Fed more access to these firms&#8217; books.</p>
<p class="b13"><strong>Increased Leverage</strong></p>
<p class="times">In the days that followed, the Republican Treasury secretary leaned on two shareholder-owned, though government-chartered, companies &#8212; <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=FNM" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for FNM');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Fannie Mae</font></a> and <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=FRE" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for FRE');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Freddie Mac</font></a> &#8212; to raise capital that their boards didn&#8217;t want to raise. In exchange, their government regulator allowed them to increase their leverage so they can buy about $200 billion more in mortgage-backed securities.</p>
<p class="times">So Fannie and Freddie will get bigger, a welcome development when mortgage markets are in trouble. Already, they have regained lost market share. They accounted for 76% of new mortgages in the fourth quarter of last year, up from 46% in the second quarter, Mr. Paulson said Wednesday. But everyone knows that if Fannie or Freddie stumble, taxpayers will get stuck with the tab.</p>
<p class="times">And then, the federal regulator of the low-profile Federal Home Loan Banks, which are even less well capitalized than Fannie and Freddie, said they could buy twice as many Fannie and Freddie-blessed mortgage-backed securities as previously permitted &#8212; more than $100 billion worth.</p>
<p class="times">Was this necessary? It&#8217;s messy, uncomfortable and undoubtedly flawed in many details. Like firefighters rushing to a five-alarm fire, policy makers are making mistakes that will be apparent only in retrospect.</p>
<p class="b13"><strong>Too Great to Ignore</strong></p>
<p class="times">But, regardless of how we got here, the clear and present danger that the virus in the housing, mortgage and credit markets is infecting the overall economy is too great to ignore. The Great Depression was worsened because the initial government reaction was wrong-headed. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke spent an academic career learning how to avoid repeating those mistakes.</p>
<p class="times">Is it working? It is helping. One key measure is the gap between interest rates on mortgages and safe Treasury securities. A wide gap means high mortgage rates, which hurt an already sickly housing market. A lot of recent activity, including Wednesday&#8217;s previously planned auction in which the Fed is trading Treasurys for mortgage-backed securities, is aimed at increasing demand for those securities to drive down mortgage rates.</p>
<p class="times">The gap remains enormous by historical standards, but has narrowed. On March 6, according to FTN Financial, 30-year fixed-rate mortgages were trading at 2.92 percentage points above the relevant Treasury rates; Wednesday the gap was down to 2.22. Normal is about 1.5 percentage points. Money markets are still under stress, as banks and others hoard cash and super-safe short-term Treasurys.</p>
<p class="times">Is it enough? Probably not. Although it&#8217;s hard to know, the downward tug on the overall economy from falling house prices persists. The next step, if one proves necessary, is almost sure to require the explicit use of taxpayer money.</p>
<p class="b13"><strong>Cushion the Blow</strong></p>
<p class="times">The case for doing more is twofold. One is to cushion the blow to families and communities, even if some are culpable. The other is to disrupt a dangerous downward spiral in which falling prices of houses and mortgage-backed securities lead lenders to pull back, hurting the economy and dragging asset prices down further, and so on.</p>
<p class="times">In ordinary times, a capitalist economy lets prices &#8212; such as those of homes, mortgage-backed securities and stocks &#8212; fall to the point where the big-bucks crowd rushes in, hoping to make a killing. But if the big money remains on the sidelines, unpersuaded that a bottom is near, the wait for bargain hunters to take the plunge could be very long and very painful.</p>
<p class="times">So the next step, no matter how it is dressed up, is likely to involve the government&#8217;s moving in ways that put a floor under prices, hoping that will limit the downside risks enough so more Americans are willing to buy homes and deeper-pocketed investors are willing, in effect, to lend them the money to do so.</p>
<p class="times"><strong>Write to </strong>David Wessel at <a href="mailto:capital@wsj.com" class="times"><font color="#0253b7">capital@wsj.com</font></a></p>
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			<wfw:commentRss>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/195/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Risky Strategy Lures Investors Seeking Yield</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/194</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/194#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2008 13:38:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/194</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
 
Popular &#8216;Reverse Convertibles&#8217;
Offer Lucrative Payouts
But Could Cause Steep Losses
By ELEANOR LAISE
March 26, 2008; Page D1
Wall Street is luring income-hungry investors with complex securities that come with big risks as well as extravagant yields.
The products &#8212; called &#8220;reverse convertibles&#8221; &#8212; are typically linked to the performance of a single stock like Apple Inc. or AT&#38;T Inc. and often [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 style="margin: 0px" class="articleTitle">
 </h1>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; margin: 0px; font: bold 16px/17px Times New Roman, Times, Serif; color: #666; padding-top: 13px">Popular &#8216;Reverse Convertibles&#8217;<br />
Offer Lucrative Payouts<br />
But Could Cause Steep Losses</p>
<p style="padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif; padding-top: 12px"><span style="font: bold 12px times new roman, times, serif" id="byl">By <strong>ELEANOR LAISE</strong><br />
<span class="aTime"><em><font size="2" color="#666666">March 26, 2008; Page D1</font></em></span></span></p>
<p class="times">Wall Street is luring income-hungry investors with complex securities that come with big risks as well as extravagant yields.</p>
<p class="times">The products &#8212; called &#8220;reverse convertibles&#8221; &#8212; are typically linked to the performance of a single stock like <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=AAPL" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for AAPL');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Apple</font></a> Inc. or <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=t" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for T');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">AT&amp;T</font></a> Inc. and often offer yields ranging from 7% to as high as 25% or more. Sales on these notes have been soaring as yields on many fixed-income investments have been sinking. Small U.S. investors snapped up $8.5 billion worth of reverse convertibles in 2007, up 81% from 2006, according to Arete Consulting LLC, which tracks the products.</p>
<p class="times">At Incapital LLC, a distributor of reverse convertibles, sales doubled in 2007 from a year earlier, says Chief Executive Tom Ricketts. The notes are issued by firms such as <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=ms" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for MS');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Morgan Stanley</font></a>, <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=bcs" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for BCS');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Barclays</font></a> PLC and <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=abn" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for ABN');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">ABN Amro Holding</font></a> NV. The companies whose share prices are linked to reverse convertibles have no involvement in the products.</p>
<p class="times">For small investors, reverse convertibles offer a high level of income for a low minimum investment. But investors typically don&#8217;t participate in any gains in the underlying stock, and if the stock falls sharply, they can lose much of their investment. Regulators have grown increasingly concerned about how complex &#8220;structured products&#8221; such as reverse convertibles are marketed to small investors, and they&#8217;re pushing issuers to closely monitor their sales practices.</p>
<p class="times">The products can be lucrative for issuers. They usually come with hefty fees, often in the range of 2% to 3% or more, which are typically priced into the yield investors get. The issuer&#8217;s ultimate profit varies depending on how it hedges against the risk of issuing the note.</p>
<p class="times">Here&#8217;s how a typical reverse convertible works: The notes are sold in $1,000 increments and offer regular interest payments during the term of the investment, typically three months to one year. Investors get their full original investment back in cash when the note matures &#8212; except under certain circumstances tied to a set &#8220;barrier&#8221; level.</p>
<p class="times">If the price of the underlying stock falls below that level &#8212; typically a drop of 20% or more &#8212; during the note&#8217;s term and then finishes below the initial stock price, investors get beaten-down shares of stock instead of cash. If the stock is down 50%, for example, they get shares worth half of their original investment.</p>
<p class="times">Because of this, reverse convertibles are particularly dangerous when linked to volatile stocks. But higher volatility makes it easier for Wall Street firms to create reverse convertibles with enticing yields. Buyers of reverse convertibles are essentially selling a &#8220;put&#8221; option on the underlying stock, which obligates them to buy the shares if they sink by a certain amount. The riskier the stock, the more the put option is worth &#8212; and the higher the yield that reverse convertibles can pay investors.</p>
<p class="times">Some observers say that things are going to get rougher. As markets get choppier, &#8220;you&#8217;ll increasingly [see] investors get burned on reverse convertibles,&#8221; says David Krein, president of DTB Capital, a New York investment adviser that specializes in structured products.</p>
<p class="times">Indeed, a growing number of reverse convertibles are leaving investors with beaten-down shares. In September, investors bought reverse convertibles linked to Countrywide Financial Corp. with a yield of 22%. The problem is that Countrywide&#8217;s share price sank more than 70% by the time the notes matured in mid-March. Bottom line: Investors lost more than half of their money, even after interest payments.</p>
<p class="times">The situation looks far bleaker with reverse convertibles issued by Barclays that were linked to <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=bsc" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for BSC');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Bear Stearns</font></a> Cos. and yield 12.3%. Bear&#8217;s stock traded well over $100 when the notes were issued in late October, but has since dropped roughly 90%. If shares remain at the current price, investors stand to lose much of their money.</p>
<p class="times">Issuers maintain that reverse convertibles, despite the risks, still offer investors attractive terms. &#8220;A lot of investors don&#8217;t believe there is a whole lot of upside in the equity markets these days,&#8221; so they don&#8217;t mind giving up gains in the underlying stocks&#8217; share price, says Kevin Woodruff, head of North America equity derivatives at Morgan Stanley.</p>
<p class="times">But some investors who had success with reverse convertibles while stocks were rising are now feeling pain. Sue Chiodo, 54 years old, of Bartlett, Ill., plowed about one-third of her portfolio into them when she retired as a sales manager for a software company about five years ago. She was attracted by the high yields and was happy with the way the notes performed &#8212; but lately many of the investments have soured.</p>
<p class="b13"><strong>Taking a Beating</strong></p>
<p class="times">Last June, she bought a reverse convertible linked to <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=IOC" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for IOC');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">InterOil </font></a>Corp. with an initial price of $42.50 yielding 31%. But within a few days, the stock had plummeted more than 50%, and Ms. Chiodo ultimately wound up with the devalued shares, which now trade at about $20. Some of her more recent reverse-convertible investments aren&#8217;t turning out much better. &#8220;I&#8217;m holding some right now that &#8230; <em>yuck</em>,&#8221; she says. &#8220;I&#8217;m going to take a beating.&#8221;</p>
<p class="times">There are other issues with the products. Investors who try to sell a reverse convertible before maturity may have trouble recouping their original investment. While many issuers maintain a secondary market in reverse convertibles, there may not be much demand for the notes &#8212; especially in a down market.</p>
<p class="times">Late last year, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority &#8212; formed by the merger of the National Association of Securities Dealers and a New York Stock Exchange regulatory arm &#8212; sent structured-products providers inquiries about their marketing and sales practices. Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin charged one firm with failing to properly supervise its brokers selling structured products.</p>
<p><img border="0" align="left" width="610" src="http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/PJ-AM059_pjREVE_20080325232426.gif" alt="[table]" height="442" class="imglftbdy" /></p>
<p class="times">&#8220;My guess is most retail people don&#8217;t walk in off the street and say, &#8216;Do you have any reverse convertibles?&#8217; &#8221; says Marc Menchel, Finra&#8217;s executive vice president and general counsel. &#8220;My guess is in most cases they&#8217;re recommended to retail [investors].&#8221;</p>
<p class="b13"><strong>Alternatives to CDs?</strong></p>
<p class="times">Brokerage firms sometimes liken reverse convertibles to far safer investments. FISN Inc. lists reverse convertibles under &#8220;CD Alternatives&#8221; on its Web site. But an investor in a certificate of deposit gets federal deposit insurance up to $100,000, whereas a reverse-convertible investor takes on far more risk. FISN President Tom Coan says the site isn&#8217;t misleading. Reverse convertibles &#8220;<em>are</em> alternatives to CDs,&#8221; he says. &#8220;They pay fixed income.&#8221;</p>
<p class="times">In 2005, the NASD suggested that firms consider limiting sales of structured products to investors approved for options trading. But even relatively sophisticated investors can run into trouble with reverse convertibles.</p>
<p class="times">Jeanne Libit, 57, of Great Falls, Va., a former CPA who is comfortable shorting stocks and trading options, started investing in reverse convertibles about two years ago because interest rates were &#8220;pathetic,&#8221; she says. She has bought about 10 reverse convertibles so far, and only about half of them gave her full investment back in cash at maturity.</p>
<p class="times">Ms. Libit lost roughly $7,000 or $8,000 of her $20,000 investment in one note linked to <a href="http://online.wsj.com/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;symbol=amd" onmouseout="window.status=('');return true" onmouseover="window.status=('   Quotes &#038; Research for AMD');return true" class="times rolloverQuote"><font color="#0253b7">Advanced Micro Devices</font></a> Inc. &#8212; and that&#8217;s only because she used other strategies like buying put options and shorting to mitigate her risk in the stock. If she hadn&#8217;t done that, she figures she would have lost about $12,000 or $13,000.</p>
<p class="times">&#8220;When they go south on you, they go south quickly,&#8221; she says.</p>
<p class="times"><strong>Write to </strong>Eleanor Laise at <a href="mailto:eleanor.laise@wsj.com" class="times"><font color="#0253b7">eleanor.laise@wsj.com</font></a></p>
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		<title>Wasn’t It Inevitable? Bear Stearns: The Book</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/193</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/193#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Mar 2008 15:42:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/193</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
Posted by Deal Journal

Who says book publishing is a slow-poke business? Only a few days after the meltdown at Bear Stearns, Bertelsmann AG’s Doubleday imprint has signed up a new book about the investment bank’s collapse and the troubles on Wall Street. “I was looking at my 401(k) plan on Friday and thinking there must [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 class="post-title"><a rel="bookmark" href="http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/03/19/wasnt-it-inevitable-bear-stearns-the-book/?mod=WSJBlog" title="Permanent Link: Wasn’t It Inevitable? Bear Stearns: The Book"></a></h2>
<p class="post-info">Posted by Deal Journal</p>
<p class="post-content"><img align="left" src="http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/OB-BE238_DB_Bil_20080319192734.jpg" alt="null" /><br />
Who says book publishing is a slow-poke business? Only a few days after the meltdown at Bear Stearns, Bertelsmann AG’s Doubleday imprint has signed up a new book about the investment bank’s collapse and the troubles on Wall Street. “I was looking at my 401(k) plan on Friday and thinking there must be a narrative that illustrates what’s going on,” says Bill Thomas, editor-in-chief of the Doubleday Broadway Publishing Group. Mr. Thomas then picked up the phone and called one of his authors, William D. Cohan, who is already under contract for another project. Mr. Cohan’s look at Lazard Frères, “The Last Tycoons,” won the 2007 Financial Times/Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award.</p>
<p>Mr. Cohan subsequently wrote a proposal over the weekend for a financial narrative that will place Bear Stearns at its hub. After speaking to Mr. Cohan’s agent, Joy Harris, Mr. Thomas struck a deal on Tuesday. The book, tentatively titled “Meltdown,” is expected to be published in spring 2009. “He will tell the story of the financial crisis in all its manifest glory through a narrative whose center is Bear Stearns,” said Mr. Thomas.</p>
<p><em>-By Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg</em></p>
<p><em>Trachentberg covers publishing for the Journal.</em></p>
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		<title>Whitney Tilson: Investors will miss out if they confuse uncertainty with risk</title>
		<link>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/192</link>
		<comments>http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/192#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Mar 2008 15:41:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mendonça</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.50centsdollar.com.br/archives/192</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[

By Whitney Tilson
Published: February 16 2008 02:52 &#124; Last updated: February 16 2008 02:52
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Dealing with uncertainty is always a key challenge for investors. But dealing with uncertainty doesn’t mean [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="ft-story-header">
<h2></h2>
<p>By Whitney Tilson</p>
<p>Published: February 16 2008 02:52 | Last updated: February 16 2008 02:52</p>
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<p id="floating-target" class="clearfix">Dealing with uncertainty is always a key challenge for investors. But dealing with uncertainty doesn’t mean avoiding it – on the contrary, it is often fuzziness about a company’s future that creates the type of opportunity bargain-hunting investors cherish.</p>
<p>Wall Street in the main hates uncertainty, which manifests itself in depressed share prices of companies whose prospects lack “visibility.” But where the market can err is in confusing uncertainty with risk. Just because a company’s future is highly uncertain doesn’t mean an investment in it is risky. In fact, some of the best potential investments are highly uncertain, but have little risk of permanent capital loss. As hedge-fund manager Mohnish Pabrai describes it in his book, <em>The Dhandho Investor</em>: “Heads, I win; tails, I don’t lose much.”</p>
<p id="floating-con">
<p class="nav-collection clearfix">
<h3 class="section"><span>EDITOR’S CHOICE</span></h3>
<p class="clearfix">
<h4><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/81510704-c623-11dc-8378-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=d8e9ac2a-30dc-11da-ac1b-00000e2511c8.html"><font color="#003399">Whitney Tilson: Strong stomach? Concentrate that portfolio</font></a><span class="pub-date"><font size="2" color="#666666"> - Jan-19</font></span></h4>
<p class="clearfix">
<h4><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/25836bbe-a540-11dc-a93b-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=d8e9ac2a-30dc-11da-ac1b-00000e2511c8.html"><font color="#003399">Whitney Tilson: Look beyond generalisations</font></a><span class="pub-date"><font size="2" color="#666666"> - Dec-08</font></span></h4>
<p class="clearfix">
<h4><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/45672784-8efe-11dc-87ee-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=d8e9ac2a-30dc-11da-ac1b-00000e2511c8.html"><font color="#003399">Whitney Tilson: Nothing to fear on the wild ride</font></a><span class="pub-date"><font size="2" color="#666666"> - Nov-09</font></span></h4>
<p class="clearfix">
<h4><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/610ade00-78cd-11dc-aaf2-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=d8e9ac2a-30dc-11da-ac1b-00000e2511c8.html"><font color="#003399">Whitney Tilson: Activist shareholders are here to stay – and investors should be glad</font></a><span class="pub-date"><font size="2" color="#666666"> - Oct-12</font></span></h4>
<p class="clearfix">
<h4><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d5725a3c-624a-11dc-bdf6-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=d8e9ac2a-30dc-11da-ac1b-00000e2511c8.html"><font color="#003399">Whitney Tilson: Hot favourites won’t always turn out to be great winners</font></a><span class="pub-date"><font size="2" color="#666666"> - Sep-14</font></span></h4>
<p class="clearfix">
<h4><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/64db0628-4cd5-11dc-a51d-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=d8e9ac2a-30dc-11da-ac1b-00000e2511c8.html"><font color="#003399">Whitney Tilson: Be ready to act when market opens a door to opportunity</font></a><span class="pub-date"><font size="2" color="#666666"> - Aug-17</font></span></h4>
<p>Among the many case studies Pabrai presents is the investment he made this decade in the funeral-home operator Stewart Enterprises. Following a debt- fuelled consolidation of the funeral-home sector, Stewart and other big players found themselves too leveraged as the economy soured. Stewart’s shares, as high as $28 in 1998, had fallen below $2 by the fall of 2000, trading at a minuscule price/earnings multiple of only three times.</p>
<p>While the market appeared to be betting on Stewart’s demise, Pabrai’s research indicated otherwise. Funeral homes were actually among the least likely businesses to fail, as non-price-sensitive customers and less-than dynamic competition resulted in stable profitability and growth over time. Stewart was producing positive free cash flow and had hard assets such as land and funeral-home properties valued conservatively at $4 per share, twice the share price at the time.</p>
<p>Stewart still faced great challenges in managing its crushing debt load, but Pabrai did what all smart investors do in dealing with the uncertainty the company faced: he identified the various ways the story might unfold and assigned probabilities to each.</p>
<p>He concluded that there was an overall 80 per cent probability that the company would deal with its debt problems in one of a few ways, in each case resulting in a doubled share price within two years. If the company went bankrupt – a scenario he assigned a 19 per cent chance – he believed the hard assets would more than cover the debt, leaving at least $2 per share in equity value. He saw only a 1 per cent chance of permanent loss of capital from the share price going to $0.</p>
<p>Given the 80 per cent chance of doubling his money and only 1 per cent chance of losing it all, Pabrai took the bet. While there was real uncertainty over exactly when and how the story would play out, he saw the risk of a permanent loss as extremely low. What happened? Soon after his purchase of Stewart shares, the company announced that it planned to sell international assets – which comprised about 20 per cent of revenues and produced little cash flow – to pay down debt. By March 2001 the company had paid down more than $50m of its debt and cash flow remained healthy – to which the market responded, taking the share price above $4. His target price reached, Pabrai sold.</p>
<p>A similar highly uncertain, but low-risk opportunity I see today is EMC’s storage business, excluding its stake in VMware. In late 2003, EMC paid $625m for VMware, a leading provider of software to the information storage industry. Following EMC’s spin-off of roughly 15 per cent of VMware in August, the company today is valued at more than $23bn, nearly triple the market-cap of EMC’s core business!</p>
<p>Is VMware, with less than a quarter of the operating income in 2007 of EMC’s core business, worth almost three times as much? Of course not. VMware is a hot stock in a hot sector and is likely highly overvalued, trading at approximately 56 times this year’s estimated earnings, while EMC’s core business is almost certainly undervalued – hence the opportunity for us.</p>
<p>An investor can isolate EMC’s core storage business by buying EMC and shorting out its stake in VMware, which creates an EMC “stub” at approximately $4.50 per share, net of cash. (Note that it can be difficult to borrow VMware shares to short, in which case one can buy puts.) We estimate that EMC’s core business will earn $0.60/share next year, so it is trading at a price/earnings ratio of 7.5, an absurdly low multiple for such a high-quality business. We think fair value is three-to-four times this.</p>
<p>One reason for this market inefficiency is the uncertainty about whether and when EMC might spin off completely its stake in VMware. The company has been coy about this, but our analysis of all 46 equity carve-outs of the past 10 years would indicate it’s merely a question of time before it spins off VMware and unlocks the unrealised value of its core storage business.</p>
<p>This is a classic case of a low-risk, high-uncertainty investment. At this price, we think we’re almost certain to make significant profits on this investment – we just don’t know when. The market hates such uncertainty and shuns it, resulting in a bargain for us.</p>
<p><em>The writer is a money manager who co-edits Value Investor Insight and co-founded the Value Investing Congress <a href="mailto:feedback@tilsonfunds.com" class="bodystrong"><strong><font color="#003399">feedback@tilsonfunds.com</font></strong></a></em></p>
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